Handcuffing the Vote: Diluting Minority Voting Power Through Prison Gerrymandering and Felon Disenfranchisement by Harrison Stevens, Rebecca et al.
The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on
Race and Social Justice
Volume 21 | Number 2 Article 1
10-2019
Handcuffing the Vote: Diluting Minority Voting
Power Through Prison Gerrymandering and Felon
Disenfranchisement
Rebecca Harrison Stevens
Texas Civil Rights Project, beth@texascivilrightsproject.org
Meagan Taylor Harding
Texas Civil Rights Project, megan@texascivilrightsproject.org
Joaquin Gonzalez
Texas Civil Rights Project, joaquinrobertogonzalez@gmail.com
Emily Eby
Texas Civil Rights Project, emily@texascivilrightsproject.org
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar
Part of the African American Studies Commons, American Politics Commons, Chicana/o
Studies Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Ethnic Studies Commons, Latina/o Studies
Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Law and Race Commons, Law and Society Commons, Law
Enforcement and Corrections Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Legal Remedies
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. It has been accepted
for inclusion in The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice by an authorized editor of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University.
For more information, please contact jlloyd@stmarytx.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rebecca Harrison Stevens, Meagan Taylor Harding, Joaquin Gonzalez & Emily Eby, Handcuffing the Vote: Diluting Minority Voting






HANDCUFFING THE VOTE: 
DILUTING MINORITY VOTING POWER 
THROUGH PRISON GERRYMANDERING 
AND FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
REBECCA HARRISON STEVENS, 
MEAGAN TAYLOR HARDING, 
JOAQUIN GONZALEZ, 
& EMILY EBY* 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 196 
I.  GERRYMANDERING PRISONS ...................................................... 197 
A. Gerrymandering ................................................................. 197 
B. Gerrymandering in Texas ................................................... 198 
C. Gerrymandering Correctional Facilities ............................. 201 
II.  UN-HANDCUFFING THE VOTE ..................................................... 203 
  Solution: Count Inmates Towards Their Home Populations ..... 203 
  Solution: Restoring Voting Privileges ....................................... 209 
1. Felon Disenfranchisement in Texas ................................... 209 
2. Reviewing Prior Equal Protection Arguments ................... 212 
3. Evolving Standards of Decency and the New Suffrage 
Movement ........................................................................... 216 
4. Texas Must Change Its Ways: Unlock the Vote for 
Prisoners ............................................................................. 222 
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 228 
 
1
Harrison Stevens et al.: Handcuffing the Vote
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019
  
196 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 21:195 
INTRODUCTION 
In the second largest state in the union, approximately 145,000 
individuals are incarcerated in state prisons for felony convictions.1  
These prisoners hail primarily from Texas’s largest and most diverse 
cities.2  Prisons, on the other hand, are located primarily in rural, sparsely 
populated, and demographically homogeneous areas of the state.3  The 
movement that results when individuals are incarcerated impacts 
redistricting lines, which are premised on state and federal representation 
being proportional to the total population of a given area—in short: more 
population, more power.   
What happens when 141,500 or so Texans are not counted in the areas 
in which they are from?4  What happens when, instead, they are counted 
amongst the population of a community they do not participate in and are 
 
* Rebecca Harrison Stevens is an attorney and the Voting Rights Director for the Texas Civil 
Rights Project; Meagan Taylor Harding is a senior attorney for the Texas Civil Rights Project 
practicing Criminal Justice Reform; Joaquin Gonzalez is a Voting Rights Fellow for the Texas Civil 
Rights Project; and Emily Eby is a Voting Rights Fellow for the Texas Civil Rights Project.  Special 
thanks to Savannah Kumar (J.D. Candidate, University of Texas School of Law, 2020) for her 
research contributions to this article. 
1. TEX. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FY 2018 STATISTICAL REPORT 1 (2018), 
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/documents/Statistical_Report_FY2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2FZ-
H8TJ] (reporting a total of 145,019 individuals “on hand”  for Texas Department of Criminal 
Justice demographics analysis and breaking the total number down into the following categories: 
134,152 (prison), 7,433 (state jail), and 3,434 (Substance Abuse Felony Punishment Facility 
Offenders)).  
2. Id. at 13-15. 
3. Unit Directory, TEX. DEP’T. CRIM. JUST., https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/unit_directory/ 
[https://perma.cc/V596-MWC6]. 
4. See TEX. LEGIS. COUNCIL, STATE AND FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING REDISTRICTING  
IN TEXAS 13, 15-16 (2011), https://tlc.texas.gov/redist/pdf/2011_0819_State_Federal_Law_ 
TxRedist.pdf [https://perma.cc/ST2Z-DZ7Q] [hereinafter TEX. LEGIS. COUNCIL, STATE AND 
FEDERAL LAW] (“[N]o court case has mandated that prison populations be reallocated or excluded 
from the population counts used for redistricting.”); see Texas Redistricting, TEX. LEGIS.  
COUNCIL, https://tlc.texas.gov/redist/requirements/summary.html (“Redistricting is the revision or 
replacement of existing districts, resulting in new districts with different geographical boundaries.  
The basic purpose of decennial redistricting is to equalize population among electoral districts after 
publication of the United States census indicates an increase or decrease in or shift of population.”).  
As the Texas Constitution mandates redistricting following the publication of each federal 
decennial census, this issue is of utmost importance in the coming years, as the next decennial 
census takes place in 2020.  See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (requiring the reapportionment of 
congressional seats according to population from the decennial census); TEX. CONST. art. III, § 28 
(requiring redistricting of state legislative seats during the legislature’s first regular session 
following the publication of each United States decennial census). 
2
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merely used as a means to make money and secure jobs?5  Through 
prison gerrymandering, certain individuals in rural communities obtain 
political power beyond their “one person, one vote” share.6  Take the 
commonplace example: a jurisdiction in Texas has a total population of 
10,000 non-incarcerated individuals, but when the incarcerated 
population is added, the total skyrockets to 15,000.  Since Texas felons 
are ineligible to vote while in prison,7 this effectively provides the 10,000 
non-incarcerated individuals with more political power than another 
jurisdiction with no prison population.8  Texas’s redistricting practice of 
including prisoners in the population count based on where they reside 
on census day, which means where they are imprisoned, in combination 
with its felon disenfranchisement law, unnecessarily obliterates “one 
person, one vote” and reduces accountability for elected officials.9 
I.    GERRYMANDERING PRISONS 
A. Gerrymandering 
Manipulation of the political process is the scourge of democracy.  
Arguably, the worst of these manipulations is gerrymandering.  The 
United States Supreme Court has held that electoral districts require 
 
5. See Jonathan Tilove, Prisoners Can’t Vote, But They Can Subtly Shift Political  
Power, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, https://www.statesman.com/news/20131201/prisoners-
cant-vote-but-they-can-subtly-shift-political-power [https://perma.cc/4QRX-3N8R] (last updated 
Sept. 25, 2018, 9:45 AM) (noting a consensus among local officials to exclude the incarcerated 
population in local redistricting, at odds with state officials who include the incarcerated population 
in their redistricting).   
6. See Peter Wagner, Breaking the Census: Redistricting in an Era of Mass Incarceration, 
38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1241, 1241-42 (2012) (“When district population counts include 
incarcerated populations, people who live close to the prison are given more of a say in government 
than everybody else.  The practice of using prison populations to dilute the voices of residents in 
other districts is referred to as ‘prison gerrymandering.’”). 
7. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 11.002(a)(4) (West 2017); see TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. 
§§ 11.001-11.002 (West 2017) (defining eligibility and qualifications for voting). 
8. TEX. LEGIS. COUNCIL, STATE AND FEDERAL LAW, supra note 4, at 15 (“Prisons are not 
distributed uniformly throughout districts used to elect government officials, and thus some districts 
rely more on their prison population to make up their total population than others. . . . [S]ince 
prisons are more likely to be located in rural areas and inmates are likely to be from urban areas, 
the presence of a prison may artificially enhance the voting strength of rural voters.”). 
9. Id. (“As the number of persons incarcerated has grown, concentrations of prison 
populations may dilute the influence of some voters and enhance the influence of others.”). 
3
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continuous redrawing to reflect population shifts.10  This process is more 
commonly known as redistricting.11  Additionally, the population of 
these districts must be generally equal to each other.12  The individuals 
tasked with drawing state and federal districts, often politicians, rely on 
the population figures provided every ten years by the United States 
Census.13 
Politicians, however, often use redistricting as an opportunity to 
gerrymander.14  Gerrymandering occurs when a political faction attempts 
to solidify power by drawing district maps in ways that are racially and 
politically discriminatory.15  These politicians effectively choose their 
voters, rather than the voters choosing them.  Unfortunately, 
gerrymandering is almost as old as the United States.16  For hundreds of 
years, politicians have drawn district maps with one goal in mind: to stay 
in power.17  Texas politicians are no exception.18 
B. Gerrymandering in Texas 
Any discussion of redistricting in Texas necessarily takes place against 
the backdrop of the state’s controversial history with impermissible 
 
10. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-66, 577 (1964). 
11. TEX. LEGIS. COUNCIL, STATE AND FEDERAL LAW, supra note 4, at 23-24. 
12. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-66, 577 (1964) (holding the Equal Protection 
Clause of the United States Constitution requires “that a State make an honest and good faith effort 
to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is 
practicable.”). 
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; TEX. CONST. art. III, § 28. 
14. See Al Kauffman, Opinion, Supreme Court Sets Stage for Partisan Gerrymandering 
Standards, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (June 30, 2018, 12:00 AM), https:// 
www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/commentary/article/Supreme-Court-sets-stage-for-partisan-130 
38365.php [https://perma.cc/8MHK-AF2R] (alleging the Wisconsin, Texas, and Maryland 
legislatures engaged in gerrymandering for partisan benefit and to discriminate along racial and 
ethnic lines). 
15. Id. 
16. CAROL ANDERSON, ONE PERSON, NO VOTE: HOW VOTER SUPPRESSION IS 
DESTROYING OUR DEMOCRACY 97-98 (2018) (“In 1810, when Massachusetts governor Elbridge 
Gerry drew a district in the shape of a salamander to corral his rivals and neutralize their influence, 
the term ‘gerrymander’ became a descriptive and ongoing part of the American political lexicon 
and life.”). 
17. Id. 
18. Stephen Young, Texas Legal Fight Over Redistricting Isn’t Over, DALL. OBSERVER, 
(Dec. 3, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.dallasobserver.com/news/texas-redistricting-fight-is-never-
going-to-die-11396118 [https://perma.cc/BT6G-7KLY]. 
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gerrymandering and voting-related discrimination.  The Supreme Court 
repeatedly struck down all-White Democratic primaries in Texas,19 
which paved the way for later landmark decisions that established the 
“one person, one vote” standard.20  Testimony on anti-Latinx 
discrimination in Texas was a central component of expanding the 
coverage of the Voting Rights Act in 1975.21  The Texas legislature’s 
efforts to disenfranchise through redistricting gave the state an 
ignominious reputation for repeatedly engaging in gerrymandering.  For 
example, in White v. Regester, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional 
multimember legislative districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties because 
the scheme diluted the votes of certain minority racial groups,22 
subsequently setting the groundwork for the modern “discriminatory 
effects” test contained in Section Two of the Voting Rights Act.23  In 
every decennial redistricting cycle since 1970, courts have found Texas’s 
proposed legislative districts to violate the Voting Rights Act of 1965.24  
After the Supreme Court struck down the Voting Rights Act’s 
preclearance formula,25 Section Two became one of the primary tools 
used to fight discriminatory redistricting practices.   
More recently, in Evenwel v. Abbott, Texans who live in Texas Senate 
districts with large registered voter populations unsuccessfully 
 
19. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664-65 
(1944); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953). 
20. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 247 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing the White 
primary cases as precedent establishing the Court’s authority to strike down unconstitutional 
electoral practices). 
21. See Charles L. Cotrell & R. Michael Stevens, The 1975 Voting Rights Act and San 
Antonio, Texas: Toward a Federal Guarantee of a Republican Form of Local Government, 8 
PUBLIUS 79, 90 (1978) (recognizing a shift from an individualistic to cultural application of the 
Equal Protection Clause by adding “language minorities” as a component of race). 
22. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973) (“Plainly, under our cases, multimember 
districts are not per se unconstitutional, nor are they necessarily unconstitutional when used in 
combination with single-member districts in other parts of the State.  But we have entertained 
claims that multimember districts are being used invidiously to cancel out or minimize the voting 
strength of racial groups.”). 
23. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986) (“Congress substantially revised § 2 
to make clear that a violation could be proved by showing discriminatory effect alone and to 
establish as the relevant legal standard the ‘results test,’ applied by this Court in White v. 
Regester[.]”). 
24. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 240 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Veasey v. Perry, 
71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 635 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 830 F.3d 216 
(5th Cir. 2016).). 
25. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). 
5
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challenged Texas’s use of total population for redistricting.26  They 
argued that the eligible voter population is a more appropriate metric, as 
opposed to the total population figure, because the total population figure 
dilutes the votes of citizens that belong to districts where large numbers 
of registered voters reside.27  Although the districts’ total population size 
varies by about 8%, the districts “measured by a voter-population 
baseline—eligible voters or registered voters—the map’s maximum 
population deviation exceeds 40%.”28  By upholding the Texas 
Legislature’s map, districts with low voter-populations held as much 
voting power as districts with almost double the number of registered 
voters. 
Texas does not limit the practice of gerrymandering to only 
congressional offices.29  Countless local political subdivisions run afoul 
of the United States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act.30  Given the 
demographic characteristics of Texas prison populations,31 the choice by 
Texas lawmakers on where to allocate prison populations for redistricting 
and whether to grant prisoners voting rights cannot be considered in a 
vacuum.  The state’s official history of voting-related discrimination 
underscores the combined discriminatory effect of prison 
gerrymandering and felon disenfranchisement. 
 
26. Evenwel v. Abbott, 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1123, 1126, 1131 (2016) (“As history, 
precedent, and practice demonstrate, it is plainly permissible for jurisdictions to measure 
equalization by the total population of state and local legislative districts” and doing so “serves 
both the State’s interest in preventing vote dilution and [the Court’s] interest in ensuring equality 
of representation.”) (emphasis in original). 
27. Evenwel v. Abbott, 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1125 (2016). 
28. Id. 
29. See TOM HOWE, H. RESEARCH ORG., INTERIM NEWS, NO. 81-5, WHERE SHOULD 
INMATES BE COUNTED FOR REDISTRICTING? 8 (2010), https://hro.house.texas.gov/pdf/ 
interim/int81-5.pdf [https://perma.cc/CC2U-XA3F] (indicating it can also affect precincts for 
county commissioners, justices of the peace, and constables). 
30. See, e.g., LULAC v. N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist., 903 F. Supp. 1071, 1093 (W.D. Tex. 1995) 
(finding that North East Independent School District’s at-large electoral system violated section 
two of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, denying Hispanics and Blacks an equal opportunity to elect 
school board candidates of their choice); see also, e.g., Patino v. City of Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d 
667, 674 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (holding the City of Pasadena’s map and plan for electing its city council 
violated section two of the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment because Pasadena 
specifically intended to dilute Latino voters). 
31. TEX. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 1 (finding that 66% of inmates in Texas 
are Black or Hispanic). 
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C. Gerrymandering Correctional Facilities 
Gerrymandering correctional facilities is the practice of counting 
inmate populations towards the district that physically houses the 
correctional facility, despite the fact that the inmate did not reside in that 
district prior to their incarceration.32  Given Texas’s history of 
impermissible gerrymandering and overt racial discrimination, the issue 
of gerrymandering correctional facilities requires an approach that 
considers how past and present socio-political-economic conditions 
intertwine to create racial disparities.33  Ultimately, the focus should be 
on the underlying intent of state and local redistricting policies. 
In Texas, the total population of a given jurisdiction, not the total 
number of eligible voters, governs representation.34  For the purpose of 
redistricting, Texas counts inmates towards the population where they are 
incarcerated.35  Counting inmates in this manner artificially increases the 
total population of representative districts that operate a correctional 
facility, giving these districts greater representational power.36  The 
increase in population figures for these districts negatively affects 
representation for districts whose residents are incarcerated in a different 
district.  This distortion is particularly unjust when the inmate intends to 
return home after serving their sentence.37  There can be dramatic 
concrete implications to this practice.  For instance, in 2011, the exclusion 
of incarcerated individuals from the population count in Harris County 
resulted in the county losing one seat in the Texas House of 
 
32. TEX. LEGIS. COUNCIL, STATE AND FEDERAL LAW, supra note 4, at 15. 
33. TEX. LEGIS. COUNCIL, STATE AND FEDERAL LAW, supra note 4, at 15 (“[B]ecause 
prisoners are disproportionately likely to be members of racial or ethnic minority groups, the 
presence of a prison could give the appearance that a district is a minority opportunity district when 
it is not.”). 
34. Evenwel v. Abbott, 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1123 (2016).  
35. See TEX. CONST. art. III, § 26 (apportioning representation based on “ . . . the population 
of the State, as ascertained by the most recent United States census . . .”); see also Final 2020 
Census Residence Criteria and Residence Situations, 83 Fed. Reg. 5525, 5535 (Feb. 8, 2018) 
(“Prisoners are counted at the facility.”).  
36. Eric Lotke & Peter Wagner, Prisoners of the Census: Electoral and Financial 
Consequences of Counting Prisoners Where They Go, Not Where They Come From, 24 PACE L. 
REV. 587, 599 (2004).  
37. See TEX. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 13-15 (showing 58,537 people 
incarcerated in TDCJ facilities who were convicted in Bexar, Dallas, Harris, Tarrant, and Travis 
counties). 
7
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Representatives.38  This loss was used as a justifications by state 
lawmakers to combine two Harris County districts with large minority 
populations, resulting in an overall dilution of voting power for these 
historically disenfranchised communities.39 
The way the state treats prison populations when drawing state and 
federal legislative districts contrasts with how local political 
subdivisions, such as counties, treat prison populations.  Generally, local 
jurisdictions do not include inmate populations when redistricting.  Many 
local Texas voting precincts count inmates towards the voting precinct 
where the inmate resided before their incarceration.40  In fact, several 
counties in Texas already remove inmates from the population count for 
the purpose of redistricting for county commissioner.41  Notably, districts 
in Concho County and Garza County could, if drawn to include the 
incarcerated population, consist almost entirely of inmates.42  Thus, to 
protect the “one person, one vote” standard, redistricting should exclude 
the incarcerated population from the total population count in the area of 
the correctional facility, unless the inmate previously resided in the 
district where the correctional facility exists.43  Furthermore, at least until 
the inmate serves their sentence, the district where the inmate resided 
prior to incarceration should continue to count the inmate towards their 
 
38. Ross Ramsey, Prisoners Don’t Vote, but They Sometimes Count, TEX. TRIB. (Sept. 30, 
2011, 5:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2011/09/30/prisoners-dont-vote-they-sometimes-
count/  [https://perma.cc/9NNP-6RFK]. 
39. See id. (“On the new maps recently approved by the Republican-dominated Legislature, 
lawmakers drew Reps. Scott Hochberg and Hubert Vo, both Democrats, into the same district, 
knowing only one can survive the election year.”). 
40. Compare TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 1.015(e) (West 2017) (“A person who is an inmate 
in a penal institution . . . does not, while an inmate, acquire residence at the place where the 
institution is located.”), with TEX. CONST. art. III, § 26 (apportioning representation based on 
“ . . . the population of the State, as ascertained by the most recent United States census . . .”), and 
Final 2020 Census Residence Criteria and Residence Situations, 83 Fed. Reg. 5525, 5535 (Feb. 8, 
2018) (“Prisoners are counted at the facility.”); see also Tilove, supra note 5 (quoting then-Judge 
Bill Coleman of Hale County). 
41. See Fixing Prison-Based Gerrymandering After the 2010 Census: Texas,  
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 2010), https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/50states/TX.html 
[https://perma.cc/8DK9-ABAU] (stating Anderson, Bee, Brazos, Childress, Concho, Coryell, 
Dawson, Grimes, Karnes, Madison, Mitchell, Pecos, Walker, and Wood Counties excluded prison 
populations for County Commissioner precincts after the 2000 census, especially noting that 
excluding the prison population in Concho County avoided a County Commissioner precinct of 
only incarcerated persons). 
42. Id.; Tilove, supra note 5. 
43. TEX. LEGIS. COUNCIL, STATE AND FEDERAL LAW, supra note 4, at 16. 
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population.44  As mass incarceration balloons, Texas must address the 
issue of properly counting the inmate population at all levels of the voting 
redistricting scheme. 
II.    UN-HANDCUFFING THE VOTE 
Solution: Count Inmates Towards Their Home Populations 
An appropriate remedy to the disproportionate representation created 
by prison gerrymandering would require the National Census Bureau 
(“Census Bureau”) to amend its counting procedure to count prisoners 
based on their residence prior to incarceration rather than the voting 
precinct where they are incarcerated.45  This would prevent the over-
representation of rural, less-populated districts and the under-
representation of urban districts struggling with mass incarceration.46  
 
44. See TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 1.015(a) (West 2017) (defining residence as “one’s home 
and fixed place of habitation to which one intends to return after any temporary absence.”) 
(emphasis added); see also Doyle v. State, No. 09–14–00458–CR, 2016 WL 908299, at *3 (Tex. 
App.—Beaumont Mar. 9, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op., not designated for publication) cert. denied 
sub nom. Doyle v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 581 (2016) (overruling a void for vagueness challenge on the 
Texas Election Code’s residence definition); see also TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 1.015(e) (West 
2017) (indicating only that inmates do not acquire residence in the “penal institution” by 
incarceration); but see TEX. CONST. art. III, §26 (deferring to the U.S. census), and Final 2020 
Census Residence Criteria and Residence Situations, 83 Fed. Reg. 5525, 5535 (Feb. 8, 2018) 
(counting prisoners as residents of the prison).  See TEX. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 
1, at 2-3 (showing the amount of inmates received by TDCJ facilities in 2018 was roughly 
equivalent to inmates released in the same year); see also HOWE, supra note 29, at 11 (“When these 
inmates return [home], they will need services and resources their home districts might not have 
been able to secure due to the temporary loss of population and political power.”). 
45. See Final 2020 Census Residence Criteria and Residence Situations, 83 Fed. Reg. 5525, 
5527 (Feb. 8, 2018) (“Of the 77,887 comments pertaining to prisoners, 77,863 suggested that 
prisoners should be counted at their home or pre-incarceration address.”); see also Peter Wagner  
& Rose Heyer, Importing Constituents: Prisoners and Political Clout in Texas, PRISON  
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Nov. 8, 2004), https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/texas/importing.html 
[https://perma.cc/UR2V-XGV9] (observing that in the past the Census Bureau changed its policy 
to address evolving demographics, such as college students attending school in places other than 
their hometowns). 
46. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 2-2A-01(2) (West 2018) (counting 
“individuals incarcerated in the State of federal correctional facilities, as determined by the 
decennial census, at their last known residence before incarceration if the individuals were residents 
of the State.”); see also, e.g., N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 83-m(13)(b) (McKinney 2019) (“[A]ll 
incarcerated persons shall be, where possible, allocated for redistricting purposes . . . at their 
respective residential addresses prior to incarceration rather than at the addresses of such 
correctional facilities.  For all incarcerated persons whose residential address prior to incarceration 
was outside of the state, or for whom the task force cannot identify their prior residential address, 
and for all persons confined in a federal correctional facility on census day, the task force shall 
9
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In 2011, the Census Bureau took a small step forward and released data 
on “group quarters” counts earlier than usual, which gave states more 
discretion on whether to “[l]eave the prisoners counted where the prisons 
are, delete them from redistricting formulas, or assign them to some other 
locale.”47  The Census Bureau counts inmates towards the city where 
they bunk for “pragmatic and administrative reasons, not legal ones.”48  
Moreover, the Census Bureau said that each state can define population 
for redistricting purposes.49  In doing so, the Census Bureau addressed 
criticism that the method of counting inmates detrimentally affected state 
representation.50  The 2011 release of group quarters data provided Texas 
with an opportunity to reevaluate the way it counts inmates in 
redistricting schemes.  States like Maryland and New York took 
advantage of this opportunity by enacting legislation to end the practice 
of counting inmates towards their location of incarceration.51  
Maryland’s law, appropriately named the “No Representation Without 
Population Act,” counts inmates that are residents of Maryland towards 
their home district.52  The Act excludes from the population count 
inmates incarcerated in Maryland that resided outside of Maryland prior 
 
consider those persons to have been counted at an address unknown[.]”).  See also ERIKA L. WOOD, 
DĒMOS, IMPLEMENTING REFORM: HOW MARYLAND & NEW YORK ENDED PRISON 
GERRYMANDERING 3 (2014), https://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/implement 
ingreform.pdf [https://perma.cc/CG9C-UY6E] (“A legislator whose district depends on the people 
incarcerated in a correctional facility to meet[] its population requirement has every incentive to 
keep that prison not just open, but filled to capacity.”). 
47. WOOD, supra note 46, at 6; see also Poverty: Group Quarters/Residence Rules,  
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/topics/income-poverty/poverty/guidance/group-
quarters.html [https://perma.cc/PW5H-8LCP] (“The Census Bureau classifies all people not living 
in housing units (house, apartment, mobile home, rented rooms) as living in group quarters.  There 
are two types of group quarters: Institutional such as correctional facilities . . . [and] Non-
Institutional, such as college dormitories . . . [.]”). 
48. Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, 895 (D. Md. 2011) (concluding states’ 
adjustment of census data during the redistricting process is consistent with the practices of the 
Census Bureau itself). 
49. Robert Groves, So, How Do You Handle Prisons?, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU  
(Mar. 1, 2010), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/director/2010/03/so-how-do-you-han 
dle-prisons.html [https://perma.cc/M6S9-8YPV] (stating the Bureau planned to release counts of 
inmates early in the 2010 Census so that states could use the data for redistricting purposes). 
50. WOOD, supra note 46, at 6. 
51. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 2-2A-01(2) (West 2018); N.Y. LEGIS. LAW  
§ 83-m(13)(b) (McKinney 2019). 
52. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 2-2A-01(2) (West 2018) 
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to their incarceration.53  The law offers significant correction to 
disproportionate districts when reasonable efforts to locate a prisoner’s 
last known address fail.54   
The Supreme Court found Maryland’s “No Representation Without 
Population Act” constitutional, affording protection for other states to 
enact similar legislation.55  The Supreme Court rejected the argument 
that states are constitutionally required to use the data provided by the 
Census Bureau without deviation in order to comply with the “one 
person, one vote” standard.56  Thus, if states choose to make adjustments, 
they must develop a non-arbitrary, systematic process.57 
New York’s law requires counting inmates in state correctional 
facilities towards their home districts and only counting them towards 
state and local districts if they were residents of New York prior to 
incarceration.58  Meanwhile, inmates in federal correctional institutions, 
inmates with a residency address outside of the State of New York prior 
to their incarceration, or inmates with an unknown address are not 




55. Fletcher v. Lamone, 567 U.S. 930 (2012) (mem.). 
56. Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F.Supp.2d 887, 894-95 (D. Md. 2011) (“We believe that the 
plaintiffs fail to read the Karcher and Kirkpatrick statements in their fuller context.  Although 
Karcher and Kirkpatrick do require states to use census data as a starting point, they do not hold, 
as the plaintiffs maintain, that states may not modify this data to correct perceived flaws.  A more 
complete reading of the opinion in Karcher makes this point clear.  The Court there recognized that 
‘the census may systematically undercount population, and the rate of undercounting may vary 
from place to place.’  It cautioned, however, that ‘[i]f a State does attempt to use a measure other 
than total population or to “correct” the census figures, it may not do so in a haphazard, inconsistent, 
or conjectural manner.’ . . . . Taken together, these Karcher statements suggest that a State may 
choose to adjust the census data, so long as those adjustments are thoroughly documented and 
applied in a nonarbitrary fashion and they otherwise do not violate the Constitution.”) (first quoting 
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 738 (1983); then quoting Karcher, 462 U.S. at 732 n. 4 (citing 
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 534-35 (1969))). 
57. Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, 894-95 (D. Md. 2011); Karcher v. Daggett, 
462 U.S. 725, 738 (1983); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 535 (1969).  
58. N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 83-m (Consol. 2011) (“The task force shall use such data to develop 
a database in which all incarcerated persons shall be, where possible, allocated for redistricting 
purposes, such that each geographic unit reflects incarcerated populations at their respective 
residential addresses prior to incarceration rather than at the addresses of such correctional 
facilities.”). 
59. Id. (“For all incarcerated persons whose residential address prior to incarceration was 
outside of the state, or for whom the task force cannot identify their prior residential address, and 
for all persons confined in a federal correctional facility on census day, the task force shall consider 
11
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for redistricting purposes is different from Maryland’s because Maryland 
requires counting inmates with unknown addresses towards the facility’s 
address.60  In 2011, the New York State Supreme Court found the New 
York law did not violate the New York State Constitution, which requires 
that the legislature use the census to appropriate inhabitants for the 
purpose of drawing districts within the state.61  
As discussed in Part I, some local officials recognize that part of 
protecting “one person, one vote” requires that prisoners be removed 
from the total population count of the district within which they are 
imprisoned.62  State officials, however, are not as amenable to the 
exclusion of inmate populations for the purpose of drawing state 
districts.63  While the Texas Constitution does not explicitly define 
“population,”64 the Texas Election Code provides that, “A person who is 
an inmate in a penal institution or who is an involuntary inmate in a 
hospital or an eleemosynary institution does not, while an inmate, acquire 
residence at the place where the institution is located.”65  In light of this 
discrepancy, one Texas district court interpreted the Texas Constitution 
to require a strict application of the data provided by the Census 
Bureau.66  The New York Supreme Court reached the opposite 
 
those persons to have been counted at an address unknown and persons at such unknown address 
shall not be included in such data set created pursuant to this paragraph.”). 
60. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 2-2A-01(2) (West 2018). 
61. Order and Decision, Little v. LATFOR, No. 2310-2011, at 7-8 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 1, 
2011),  https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Decision%20and%20Order_1%2 
0(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/K7YG-RV7S] (explaining how inmates may be physically present in the 
locations of the correctional facilities at the time of the census count, however, they lack actual 
permanency as they can be transferred between the state’s many correctional facilities at DOCCS’s 
discretion). 
62. HOWE, supra note 29 (estimating more than 100 local governments exclude inmate 
populations when drawing representative districts). 
63. Id. (“During the 2009 regular session of the 81st Texas Legislature, the House 
Corrections Committee heard testimony on . . . HB 2855 . . . which would have required Texas to 
count inmates at their addresses before incarceration.  During the 2001 regular session, the House 
Elections Committee favorably reported a similar bill, HB 2639 . . . which the House rejected by 
48-91-3.  In addition, U.S. Rep. Gene Green, D-Houston, has filed a bill in Congress (H.R. 2075) 
that would require the Census Bureau to count inmates at their previous addresses for the 2020 
Census.”). 
64. TEX. CONST. art. III, §§ 25-26 (amended Nov. 6, 2001). 
65. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 1.015(e) (West 2017). 
66. Perez v. Texas, Nos. 11–CA–360–OLG–JES–XR, SA–CA–361–OLG–JES–XR, SA–
11–CA–490–OLG–JES–XR, SA–11– CA–592–OLG–JES–XR, SA–11– CA–615–OLG–JES–XR, 
SA–11–CA–635–OLG–JES–XR, 2011 WL 9160142, at 12 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2011) (unpublished 
12
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conclusion from that of the Texas court, despite having very similar 
constitutions.67  The New York Constitution states: 
Except as herein otherwise provided, the federal census taken in the year 
nineteen hundred thirty and each federal census taken decennially 
thereafter shall be controlling as to the number of inhabitants in the state 
or any part thereof for the purposes of the apportionment of members of 
assembly and readjustment or alteration of senate and assembly districts 
next occurring, in so far as such census and the tabulation thereof purport 
to give the information necessary therefor.68  
In Little v. LATFOR, the New York Supreme Court noted that the Census 
Bureau directed that states exercise discretion to “create their own 
methodology for counting inmates for apportionment purposes.”69  
While the New York Constitution mandated the use of census data for 
redistricting purposes, the Court found that the inmates were not within 
the meaning of “inhabitants” because they lacked “actual permanency” 
or an “intent to remain” incarcerated.70  Thus, the court found that a 
deviation from the strict application of the census data did not violate the 
state’s constitution.71  
The Texas Constitution is similar to the New York Constitution 
because they both require the use of census data to calculate the number 
of inhabitants for redistricting purposes.72  Texas must use the numbers 
 
table decision) (“The Texas Election Code states that prisoners are not residents, for voting 
purposes, of the county where they are incarcerated. Nevertheless, the U.S. Census Bureau counts 
them as such, and the Texas Constitution requires use of the census count as the basis for 
redistricting.”) (citation omitted) (citing TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 1.015(e) (West 2017) (citing 
TEX. CONST. art. III, § 26). 
67. Order and Decision, Little v. LATFOR, No. 2310-2011, at 7-8 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 1, 
2011), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Decision%20and%20Order_1%2 
0(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/K7YG-RV7S]. 
68. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4 (amended 2014). 
69. Order and Decision, Little v. LATFOR, No. 2310-2011, at 6 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 1, 
2011),  https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Decision%20and%20Order_1%2
0(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/K7YG-RV7S] (“In March 2010, Groves stated that the Census Bureau 
counts individuals at their ‘usual residence’ and that, for inmates in particular, states were free to 
decide the manner in which prisoners were counted, namely, at the prisons, at their pre-
incarceration addresses or altogether removed from ‘redistricting formulas’ where residential 
information was unavailable.”). 
70. Id. at 5.  
71. Id. at 6.  
72. Compare N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4 (amended 2014) (“[E]ach federal census taken 
decennially thereafter shall be controlling as to the number of inhabitants in the state or any part 
13
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provided by the Census Bureau to draw its districts.  The requirement by 
the Texas Constitution does not, however, prohibit redistricting schemes 
to count inmates as residing in their home districts.  Who counts as 
“population” is the relevant inquiry.  
The Texas Legislature has the authority to define “population” in a 
manner that counts inmates towards their home district, and not towards 
the district where the correctional facility is located.  In doing so, the 
Texas Legislature can correct the disproportional representation afforded 
to mostly rural districts and help restore the “one person, one vote” 
principle.  Undoubtedly, the Texas Legislature uses redistricting as a 
mechanism to retain power almost exclusively within one party.  The 
current redistricting approach creates a supermajority in the hands of one 
political party, and there is little incentive to change the way redistricting 
schemes use correctional facilities to curve the population figures in their 
favor.  With one legal challenge to the current map held in their favor, the 
prison gerrymandering practice is likely to remain in place in Texas, at 
least for the foreseeable future.73   
Solution: Restoring Voting Privileges  
Turning to another aspect of the gerrymandering conundrum and the 
vestiges of Jim Crow: Texans lose their right to vote upon felony 
conviction.74  These two issues—gerrymandering and felon 
disenfranchisement—work in tandem to strip inmates of representation.  
The Eighth Amendment provides the best vehicle for abolishing felon 
disenfranchisement. 
 
thereof for the purposes of the apportionment of member of assembly and readjustment or alteration 
of senate and assembly districts . . . .”), with TEX. CONST. art. III, § 26 (“The members of the House 
of Representatives shall be apportioned among the several counties, according to the number of 
population in each, as nearly as may be, on a ratio obtained by dividing the population of the State, 
as ascertained by the most recent United States census . . . .”). 
73. Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, 895-96 (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
TABULATING PRISONERS AT THEIR “PERMANENT HOME OF RECORD” ADDRESS 10 (2006), 
https://felonvoting.procon.org/sourcefiles/tabulating_prisoners.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WEB-
5UQJ]).  In 2011, Texas State Representative Harold Dutton, filed suit to challenge the practice of 
counting prisoners where they are incarcerated during redistricting.  The lawsuit alleged that 
counting prisoners where they reside instead of based on where they are from, inflated the residents 
of certain districts and resulted in disproportionate representation. 
74. TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1; TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 11.002(a)(4) (West 2017). 
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1. Felon Disenfranchisement in Texas 
Suffrage is the right to vote in political elections.75  Several 
constitutional amendments expanded suffrage rights or removed voting 
barriers.  Each sought to establish or protect existing voting rights for 
different groups of citizens.76  These amendments represent the 
progression of a society that recognized, sometimes through reluctant 
acquiescence, the value in the right to vote.77  The right to vote is the 
right from which all others flow and is the most fundamental right in our 
democratic government.78  Stripping prisoners of their voting rights, 
while still counting them for redistricting electoral districts, undermines 
the principle of “one person, one vote”.79 
“Civil death” is the practice of discontinuing certain civil rights and 
liberties because of the person’s criminal convictions.80  The use of civil 
 
75. TEX. CONST. art. VI (labeling Article VI of the Texas Constitution as “Suffrage,” and 
laying out the foundations of voting and elections in Texas). 
76. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XV (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States of by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (“The right of the citizens of the 
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account 
of sex.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any 
primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice 
President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”); U.S. CONST. 
amend. XXVI (“The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, 
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.”). 
77. Cf. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (“Time works changes, brings 
into existence new conditions and purposes.  Therefore, a principle, to be vital, must be capable of 
wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.  This is peculiarly true of constitutions.  
They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions.”); Corinna Barrett Lain, 
Lessons Learned from the Evolution of Evolving Standards, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 661, 666-67 
(2010) (summarizing the Supreme Court’s defense of a progressive reading of the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause as they determined whether a punishment could also be cruel and 
unusual if it was disproportionate to the crime). 
78. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (“Though not regarded strictly as a 
natural right, but as a privilege merely conceded by society, . . . nevertheless [voting] is regarded 
as a fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights.”). 
79. Dale E. Ho, Captive Constituents: Prison-Based Gerrymandering and the Current 
Redistricting Cycle, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 355, 359 (2011). 
80. Pamela A. Wilkins, The Mark of Cain: Disenfranchised Felons and the Constitutional 
No Man’s Land, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 85, 107 (2005) (“The idea behind civil death was the 
destruction of the convicted felon’s political existence; the death sentence imposed automatically 
for most felonies would destroy the person’s physical existence, but the person’s legal existence 
also had to be eliminated.”). 
15
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death as a punishment began to decline in the 1950s, but the imposition 
of voting prohibitions for convicted felons survived.81  Stripping people 
with felony convictions of their voting rights, also known as felon 
disenfranchisement, is one of the few remaining vestiges of civil death in 
the United States.82  This practice results in far reaching collateral 
consequences that can cause almost insurmountable barriers for persons 
exiting incarceration.   
Felon disenfranchisement laws served as one pretext for limiting 
Blacks from voting, particularly in the South.83  Whites in the South 
became ever-increasingly concerned about the Black vote and employed 
a full array of methods to retain power.   In addition to felon 
disenfranchisement, Southern states used poll taxes, literacy tests, and 
physical intimidation to keep Blacks from voting.84 
In Texas, re-enfranchisement of post-felony conviction occurs two 
years “[after] the issuance of discharge papers” from felony conviction.85  
In 1997, the Texas Legislature repealed the two-year waiting period and 
added more precise language that allowed automatic restoration of voting 
rights upon completion of a felony sentence.86  Today, Texas bars people 
from voting upon felony conviction until the end of his or her sentence, 
including the completion of probation—whether community supervision 
 
81. Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass 
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1798 (2012). 
82. Wilkins, supra note 80 (noting loss of citizenship and loss of legal protections among 
other rights lost in a civil death). 
83. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 231 (1985) (concluding “discrimination 
against [B]lacks, as well as against poor [W]hites, was a motivating factor for the [Alabama] 
provision” that disenfranchised persons convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude); see also 
Ratliff v. Beale, 20 So. 865, 868 (Miss. 1896) (noting the crimes that disqualified people from 
voting included crimes like burglary and theft—crimes Blacks were more likely to be found guilty 
of—while murder and robbery convictions did not disqualify people from voting). 
84. See Ratliff v. Beale, 20 So. 865, 869 (Miss. 1896) (holding a poll tax in Mississippi was 
employed primarily for the purpose of restricting access to voting polls); see also McLaughlin v. 
City of Canton, 947 F.Supp. 954, 977 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (“After the Civil War, [B]lacks comprised 
the majority of the electorate of Mississippi, since [W]hites who had supported the Confederacy 
were denied the vote. . . . [T]his development was greeted by obstructionist [W]hites 
with . . . disenfranchising tactics and methods, including literacy and property tests, poll taxes, 
understanding clauses, and grandfather clauses. . . . Some historians have remarked that 
disenfranchising provisions in state constitutions for convictions of certain “[B]lack” crimes was 
one additional method explored.”). 
85. House Comm. on Elections, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 1001, 75th Leg., R. (1997). 
86. Id. (noting the confusion arose when paroled inmates were released from custody 
although not released in the sense that they had completed their felony sentence).  
16
The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 21 [2019], No. 2, Art. 1
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol21/iss2/1
  
2019] HANDCUFFING THE VOTE 211 
or deferred adjudication.87  Therefore, people with a felony conviction in 
Texas suffer a temporary civil death with respect to their voting 
privileges.   
Although temporal, the significance is profound.  In light of mass 
incarceration and conviction rates, the implications of civil death have 
become even more oppressive.88  The Texas Department of Criminal 
Justice has one of the largest prison population in the country in 2016.89  
Between the number of inmates incarcerated and those on probation with 
felony convictions, Texas barred approximately 500,000 people from 
voting in 2016.90   
Demographics of Texas inmates also show a disproportionate 
representation of Black and Hispanic communities.91  Thus, Black and 
Hispanic Texans are more likely to suffer from disenfranchisement than 
White Texans.  Although no longer explicitly stated and more nebulous, 
felon disenfranchisement remains faithful to its original purpose: it 
removes Black communities, and now Hispanic communities too, from 
the voting population in significant numbers. 
 
87. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 11.002 (West 2017).  Cf. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. 
§ 141.001(a)(4) (West 2017) (barring a person with a felony conviction from running for office 
until they have completed their sentence and received a pardon); see also Letter from  
Ann McGeehan, Tex. Sec’y of State, to Voter Registrars, Effect of Felony Conviction on Voter 
Registration (Aug. 3, 2004), https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/laws/effects.shtml [https:// 
perma.cc/RA6F-7LT8] (noting that in Texas “there is no automatic restoration of the right to be a 
candidate, as there is for voting purposes, after a full discharge. Absent a pardon, the candidate 
must have obtained a judicial release from his or her disabilities in order to run for any office to 
which this section applies.”). 
88. See JEAN CHUNG, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT:  
A PRIMER 3 (July 17, 2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/ 
Felony-Disenfranchisement-Primer.pdf. [https://perma.cc/P2MV-U9GA] (noting the prison 
population ballooned from 1976 to 2016 resulting in an imprisoned population of 6.1 million  
people by 2016). 
89. E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,  
PRISONERS IN 2016, at 4 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pd£’p16.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/7CT3-V3NY] (listing California as the second state with the highest incarcerated 
population). 
90. State-by-State Data, SENT’G PROJECT, https://www.sentencingproject.org/the-facts/# 
detail?state1Option=U.S.%20Total&state2Option=0 [https://perma.cc/ED2R-CMEN]. 
91. Compare TEX. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 8 (estimating the 
incarcerated population divided by race resulted in about 33.3% White, 32.7% Black, and 33.5% 
Hispanic), with Texas Profile, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles/ 
TX.html [https://perma.cc/RU3W-BGHQ] (finding Black and Hispanic communities are 
overrepresented in Texas prisons because Whites consist of 42% of the population in Texas while 
Blacks and Hispanics make up the remaining 38% and 12% of the population, respectively). 
17
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2. Reviewing Prior Equal Protection Arguments 
Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution provides: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.92 
This has been interpreted to expressly authorize state felon 
disenfranchisement laws.93  In Richardson v. Ramirez, the seminal felon 
disenfranchisement case, the Supreme Court held that California’s 
practice of disenfranchising convicted felons was not a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.94  The Court was convinced that Section Two 
of the Fourteenth Amendment provided an “affirmative sanction” and 
that the possible intent of Congress was to allow states the right to levy 
the penalty on convicted felons.95  Disappointingly, the Court accepted 
the legal fiction that they had no authority to assign weight to the public 
policy concerns surrounding disenfranchisement.96  Significantly, upon 
 
92. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2 
93. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (“We hold that the understanding of 
those who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, as reflected in the express language of [Section] 2 
and in the historical and judicial interpretation of the Amendment’s applicability to state laws 
disenfranchising felons, is of controlling significance in distinguishing such laws from those other 
state limitations on the franchise which have been held invalid under the Equal Protection Clause 
by this Court.”).  Cf. id. at 74 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“It is clear that [Section] 2 was not intended 
and should not be construed to be a limitation on the other sections of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Section 2 provides a special remedy—reduced representation—to cure a particular form of electoral 
abuse—the disenfranchisement of Negroes.  There is no indication that the framers of the 
provisions intended that special penalty to be the exclusive remedy for all forms of electoral 
discrimination.”). 
94. Id. at 54. 
95. Id. (analyzing the legislative history of the passage of Section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
96. Accord id. at 56 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Although, in the last century, this Court may 
have justified the exclusion of voters from the electoral process for fear that they would vote to 
change laws considered important by a temporal majority, I have little doubt that we would not 
countenance such a purpose today.  The process of democracy is one of change.  Our laws are not 
frozen into immutable form, they are constantly in the process of revision in response to the needs 
of a changing society.”); see, e.g., Lain, supra note 77, at 672-73, 675 (explaining how death 
penalty Supreme Court decisions inconsistently consider, or depart from considering, jurisdictions, 
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the passage of Section Two, Congress was aware of its potential for 
discriminatory enforcement and added the language “under laws equally 
applicable to all the inhabitants of said State” to protect against wholesale 
disenfranchisement of Black men by allowing a State to “make one set of 
laws applicable to white men, and another set of laws applicable to 
colored men.”97   
A little more than a decade later, the Supreme Court revisited the felon 
disenfranchisement and Equal Protection question reviewing Alabama’s 
disenfranchisement scheme.  This time, the Court found the law 
unconstitutional, anchoring its decision in the prohibition against 
intentional race-based discrimination found in Section One of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.98  Reviewing the legislative record, the Court 
found that the goal of requiring persons to be stripped of their voting 
rights if convicted of certain crimes, including crimes of moral turpitude, 
was to disenfranchise Black and poor White people.99  This provision ran 
afoul the Equal Protection Clause and Section Two of the Fourteenth 
Amendment which was not designed to allow intentional racial 
discrimination.100   
However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has appellate 
jurisdiction over federal district courts in Texas, has not always 
invalidated disenfranchisement laws passed with racial animus.101  In 
fact, while examining the legislative record of the passage of 
Mississippi’s felon disenfranchisement law, the Court determined that the 
original discriminatory purpose of the law—to disenfranchise Black 
people—was miraculously cured by a later amendment that added murder 
and rape (and removed burglary) to the list of crimes for which voting 
 
trends, opinions and viewpoints of relevant organizations, as the Court manipulates the meaning of 
“cruel and unusual punishment” according to the ideological preferences of the sitting majority). 
97. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 2600 (May 27, 1868). 
98. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985). 
99. See id. at 231-33 (emphasizing the racially discriminatory intent and effect of the statute 
despite having a potentially valid reason for its enactment). 
100. See id. at 232-33 (“[W]e are confident that § 2 was not designed to permit the 
purposeful racial discrimination attending the enactment and operation of § 182 which otherwise 
violates § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
101. See, e.g., Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 389-90 (5th Cir. 1998) (complaining that 
appellant was not disenfranchised because “armed robbery” was not the same crime as “theft” and 
the discriminatory intent of section 241 of the Mississippi Constitution rendered the statute 
unconstitutional). 
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rights could be stripped.102  The Court was convinced that the addition 
of murder and rape was indicia that the statute was no longer intended to 
reduce the number of Black people who could vote, since those crimes 
were not considered “Black crimes.”103   
In a limited holding, the Fifth Circuit has found that the process by 
which felon disenfranchisement statutes are enforced must be 
administered fairly, avoiding arbitrary and selective enforcement.104  In 
Williams, the petitioner alleged that Mississippi’s procedure (1) 
“impermissibly select[ed] blacks for disenfranchisement” and (2) the 
Board failed “to follow the statutory procedures in Miss. Code Ann. 
§§ 23-5-35, 23-5-37.”105  The Court mainly took issue with the 
petitioner’s second allegation and stated “[a] state may make a 
completely arbitrary distinction between groups of felons so as to work a 
denial of equal protection with respect to the right to vote when it 
administers a statute, fair on its face, with an unequal hand.”106  With 
respect to the Petitioner’s first claim—intentional selection of Blacks for 
disenfranchisement—the Court articulated a test that would likely be 
impossible to prove.107   
The Fifth Circuit has additionally ruled that felon disenfranchisement 
laws treating persons with felony convictions differently are acceptable 
under rational basis scrutiny—that is, as long as there is a rational 
relationship between this differential treatment and a legitimate 
governmental interest.108  By utilizing various re-enfranchisement 
processes for persons convicted of state felonies and federal felonies, the 
Equal Protection Clause was not violated.109   
 
102. Id. at 391. 
103. Id.  
104. See Williams v. Taylor, 677 F.2d 510, 517 (5th Cir. 1982) (“While [appellant] has no 
right to vote as a convicted felon . . . he has the right not to be the arbitrary target of the Board’s 
enforcement of the statute.”). 
105. Id. at 515-16. 
106. Id. at 515-16. 
107. See id. at 517 (“Obviously, if the evidence at trial shows that the group of felons who 
have not been disenfranchised are [W]hite, then it will tend to support appellant’s assertion of racial 
discrimination.”).  
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Other circuits have also rejected challenges to felon 
disenfranchisement laws.  The Third Circuit rejected a challenge brought 
by a prisoner alleging Pennsylvania’s law violated the Equal Protection 
Clause because it allowed non-incarcerated felons to vote while denying 
the right to incarcerated felons.110   The Ninth Circuit has similarly held 
that Section Two did not only apply to common law felonies and refusing 
to restore voting rights until the completion of all conviction terms, 
including payment of fines and restitution, was constitutional.111  The 
Sixth Circuit declined to find that Tennessee’s felon disenfranchisement 
statute had a disparate impact on Black people due to the disproportionate 
number of Black people convicted of felonies in the state.112  Although 
the district court found racial discrimination in the original passage of the 
law, and the continuation of such discriminatory effects, the Sixth Circuit 
stated, “such evidence of past discrimination ‘cannot, in the manner of 
original sin, condemn action that is not in itself unlawful.’”113   
Even though Richardson did not foreclose all Fourteenth Amendment 
challenges,114 Equal Protection arguments have not fared well in the 
courts since its publication.115  Notwithstanding the disproportionate 
racial impact, and at times, the racially discriminatory intent of felon 
disenfranchisement laws, courts have been reluctant to deviate from 
 
110. See Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25 (3rd Cir. 1983) (“. . . Pennsylvania could rationally 
determine that those convicted felons who had served their debt to society and had been released 
from prison or whose crimes were not serious enough to warrant incarceration in the first instance 
stand on a different footing from those felons who required incarceration and should therefore be 
entitled to participate in the voting process.”). 
111. See Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2010) (distinguishing plaintiff 
from indigent unincarcerated felons to draw support for Arizona’s voting scheme under the rational 
basis analysis). 
112. See Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1260-61 (6th Cir. 1986) (looking beyond 
evidence of historical racial discrimination in the state and viewing the issue in totality of the 
circumstances to come to the “inescapable conclusion” that the Voting Rights Act was not 
violated). 
113. Id. at 1261 (quoting City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980)). 
114. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) (remanding respondent’s contention 
that selective enforcement by county election officials violated the Equal Protection Clause to the 
Supreme Court of California). 
115. See Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1261 (6th Cir. 1986) (“It is undisputed that a 
state may constitutionally disenfranchise convicted felons . . . ”) (emphasis added) (citing 
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 94 (1974)). 
21
Harrison Stevens et al.: Handcuffing the Vote
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019
  
216 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 21:195 
Richardson.116  A different approach allowing courts more flexibility is 
required.  
3. Evolving Standards of Decency and the New Suffrage Movement 
Eighth Amendment case law has often evoked consideration of the 
“evolving standards of decency” that transforms as society matures.117  
“Evolving standards”118 open the door for discussion about preserving 
the constitutional right to vote for incarcerated persons.  Although this 
standard has usually been used to address oppressive and 
unconstitutionally cruel prison conditions119 or unduly harsh 
punishments,120 it is available to address the broader collateral 
consequences of criminal conviction.121   
The tide of public opinion on felon disenfranchisement is changing.  
Recently, voters in Florida issued a resounding rejection of the state’s 
permanent disenfranchisement of over 1.4 million people who had felony 
convictions, with the passage of Florida Amendment Four, or the Voting 
Rights Restoration for Felons Initiative.122  Before the passage of the 
 
116. See Wilkins, supra note 80, at 100 (“When presented with Eighth Amendment 
challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws, judges typically rely on . . . Richardson v. Ramirez 
for the proposition that disenfranchisement is constitutionally permitted no matter what.”). 
117. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 269-70 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Ours 
would indeed be a simple task were we required merely to measure a challenged punishment against 
those that history has long condemned.  That narrow and unwarranted view of the Clause, however, 
was left behind with the 19th century.  Our task today is more complex.  We know ‘that the words 
of the [Clause] are not precise, and that their scope is not static.’  We know, therefore, that the 
Clause ‘must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.’” (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958))). 
118. The theory that a practice may be prohibited when a “national consensus has formed 
against it” and “a majority of state have already done so on their own.”  See Lain, supra note 77. 
119. See Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 333-34 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding filthy cell 
conditions—including dried fecal matter on the walls, ceilings, and bars, as well as areas with no 
air-conditioning during the summer, both of which exacerbate the infestation of pests—constitute 
an Eighth Amendment violation). 
120. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (finding the use of denationalization—
stripping a native-born American of their United States citizenship—to be cruel and unusual 
punishment and therefore a violation of the Eighth Amendment). 
121. See generally Wilkins, supra note 80, at 129 (proposing “courts should presume that a 
state-imposed sanction or disability triggered directly and automatically by a criminal conviction 
is, in fact, punishment subject to Eighth Amendment regulation.”). 
122. See Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Florida, BRENNAN CTR. JUST. (Nov. 7, 2018), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-rights-restoration-efforts-florida [https://perma.cc/ 
DN62-PW5Y] (“On November 6, 2018, Florida voters approved a constitutional amendment 
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referendum, the Eleventh Circuit had already ruled that Florida’s method 
of restoring (or not restoring) voting rights for felons violated the First 
Amendment freedom of association and freedom of expression.123  This 
is the latest example of the public issuing a referendum on the age old 
practice of civil death, but certainly not the only.124   
Civil death is counterproductive to successful rehabilitation and re-
integration into society.  Recidivism increases when laws are confusing 
and not clarified to supervised persons125 and criminalize positive re-
entry behaviors like civic participation.126  In Texas, voting rights are 
automatically restored upon the completion of one’s sentence, but there 
has been confusion, even amongst election officials, about how to apply 
 
automatically restoring the right to vote to 1.4 million individuals with felony convictions in  
their past.  The amendment restores the right to vote for people with felony convictions,  
except individuals convicted of murder or felony sexual offenses, once they have completed the 
terms of their sentence, including probation and parole.”); see also Emily Bazelon, Will Florida’s  
Ex-Felons Finally Regain the Right to Vote?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2018/09/26/magazine/ex-felons-voting-rights-florida.html [https://perma.cc/8LS2-
S27C] (detailing the history of Florida’s Amendment 4 and the effects it can have on former felons 
like Neil Volz and restoring democracy in government). 
123. Order Granting Summary Judgment at 8, Hand v. Scott, 285 F. Supp. 3d 1289  
(N.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2018) (No. 4:17-cv-00128-MW-CAS), http://fairelectionsnetwork.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/144-Order-Granting-Plaintiffs-Motion-for-Summary-Judgment.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/CMV8-7DZ7] (“Defendants essentially argue that vote-restoration for former felons can 
only occur on the state’s terms.  ECF No. 103, at 30-31.  Once a felon loses the right to vote, only 
the state may grant it back in a manner of its choosing.  A person convicted of a crime may have 
long ago exited the prison cell and completed probation.  Her voting rights, however, remain locked 
in a dark crypt.  Only the state has the key—but the state has swallowed it.  Only when the state 
has digested and passed that key in the unforeseeable future—maybe in five years, maybe in 50—
along with the possibility of some virus-laden stew of viewpoint discrimination and partisan, 
religious, or racial bias, does the state in an “act of mercy,” unlock the former felon’s voting rights 
from its hiding place.”) (citing Fla. R. Exec. Clemency 1). 
124. Felon Voting Rights, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS. (Dec. 21, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx [https://perma.cc/5N5X-GPMY] 
(detailing state policies regarding felon disenfranchisement and recent state efforts to towards the 
restoration of voting rights). 
125. See, e.g., Sasha von Olderhausen, ‘I Wish I Could Vote’: An Ex-Felon’s Election Day, 
TEX. OBSERVER (Nov. 8, 2016, 8:38 AM), https://www.texasobserver.org/felon-disenfranchise 
ment-presidio/ [https://perma.cc/T5WT-JW2W] (illustrating an ex-felon’s misconception of his 
right to vote). 
126. See, e.g., id. (finding 2.9% of eligible voters, not including eligible voters who have 
failed to re-enter the system, are prohibited from voting because of state felony disenfranchisement 
laws). 
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the law.127  However, even though voting rights are eventually restored, 
there is the risk of prosecution if someone mistakenly believes they have 
the right to vote.128  The risk of going back to prison has been actualized 
in Texas for casting a provisional ballot.129   
In 2016, in Fort Worth, Texas, Crystal Mason, a Black woman, decided 
to vote after being persuaded by her mother.130  Mason had been released 
from federal prison after serving a sentence for tax fraud and was still 
under federal supervision.131  She believed she could vote and went to 
cast her ballot, but ultimately cast a provisional ballot (a ballot that 
ultimately did not count) after discovering she was not on the voter 
rolls.132  No one at the polling location told her that she could not vote, 
even though at least one person there knew she had a felony 
conviction.133  She was ultimately prosecuted for voting illegally and 
sentenced to five years in prison.134  This sentence is one example of the 
injustice of civil death and the ways in which it can be applied harshly 
producing grave consequences to an individual, particularly because the 
sentence levied against Mason, who is both Black and a woman, was 
disproportionate.  Sentences like these have a chilling effect.  When 
utilizing the right to vote can potentially cost a person their freedom, 
especially those who have already experienced the loss of liberty in a cell, 
 
127. Letter from Ann McGeehan, supra note 87 (addressing the confusion associated with 
voter registration and final felony convictions). 
128. Brief for ACLU & Texas Civil Rights Project as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant 
at 2, Texas v. Mason, No. D432-1485710-00 (432nd Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Tex. 2018), 
https://www.aclutx.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/mason_amicus_brief_5.23.18_final.pd
f [https://perma.cc/5NDL-5GLC] (“Any mistake—no matter how innocent—will be penalized with 
the full force of the criminal law.  Such a message, if not rejected . . . will inevitably chill 
participation in elections and undermine the strength of our democracy.”). 
129. Id. (rejecting the State’s position of criminalizing an “innocent mistake made is casting 
a provisional ballot.”) (emphasis original). 
130. Mitch Mitchell, Texas Woman Who Got Five Years in Prison Among Six Million in 
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the cost can be too high to pay to participate in representative 
democracy.135   
Considering the discriminatory history of felon disenfranchisement 
laws, the unequal practice of counting prisoners into voting populations 
of which they have no civic influence, and the ongoing discriminatory 
impact of felon disenfranchisement laws, there is only one reasonable 
conclusion: people with felony convictions should not be stripped of 
voting privileges at all.  Forfeiture of voting privileges upon conviction 
has been widely accepted,136 but there is no constitutional requirement 
that it remain in place.  As opinions about voting change and the public 
becomes more educated about the inequities of our criminal justice 
system, disenfranchisement moored to criminality will likely become 
unpopular.   
The Eighth Amendment is an appropriate vehicle to push for  
changes in this area because it is not “static”,137 rather, it is malleable 
enough to encapsulate modern changes in society.138  This is apparent 
throughout Eighth Amendment case law and especially in jurisprudence 
outlawing once widely accepted practices like the death penalty for 
crimes that did not result in a death,139 life without parole for  
 
135. Brief for ACLU & Texas Civil Rights Project as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant 
at 11, Texas v. Mason, No. D432-1485710-00 (432nd Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Tex. 2018), 
https://www.aclutx.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/mason_amicus_brief_5.23.18_final.pd
f [https://perma.cc/5NDL-5GLC] (suggesting there is little support explaining why a person would 
risk up to twenty years in prison just to cast a ballot in an election). 
136. See, e.g., Brian Pinaire et al., Barred from the Vote: Public Attitudes Toward the 
Disenfranchisement of Felons, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1519, 1536 (2003) (finding only 9.9% of 
people surveyed believe that convicted felons should never lose their right to vote while 35.2% 
believe felons should lose their right to vote while they are incarcerated, on parole, or probation). 
137. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958) (“The Court recognized in that case 
that the words of the Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not static.  The Amendment 
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society”); see also Wilkins, supra note 80, at 137 (“[T]he Eighth Amendment’s scope is not static, 
but may expand as society progresses.”). 
138. Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 790 F.2d 1220, 1223 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding the Eighth 
Amendment to be judged under a contemporary standard of decency); see also Lain, supra note 77, 
at 674-75. 
139. See e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 447 (2008) modified 554 U.S. 945 
(2008) (holding the Eighth Amendment barred Louisiana from imposing the death penalty for the 
rape of a child that did not result in death because “[i]n most cases justice is not better served by 
terminating the life of the perpetrator rather than confining him and preserving the possibility that 
he and the system will find ways to allow him to understand the enormity of his offense.”).  
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juveniles,140 and the practice of executing those with intellectual 
development disorders.141  In other words, Eighth Amendment case law 
has developed alongside society, and the Court has found many 
punishments to violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause once 
they lose public popularity.142  
Contrary to the Court’s dicta in Richardson,143 the Fifth Circuit 
expressly stated that “while an Eighth Amendment determination must 
not be merely a judge’s subjective views, the Constitution contemplates 
that ultimately a court’s own judgment will be brought to bear on the 
question.”144  Even without express judicial acquiescence, it is axiomatic 
that subjective views enter judicial interpretation.  In dicta, the Fifth 
Circuit reinforced transforming values can render once-accepted actions 
unconstitutional.145   Admittedly, challenges to felon disenfranchisement 
have largely failed, but bringing a claim challenging the practice of 
gerrymandering prisons in tandem with a challenge to the loss of voting 
privileges might produce some favor.   
First, the Court would have to determine that felon disenfranchisement 
in Texas was punishment, not merely  regulation.146  In other contexts, 
 
140. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477-78 (2012) (noting that sentencing a juvenile 
to life without parole fails to account for hallmarks of youth, like failure to appreciate consequences 
for actions, dysfunctional home environments that a child may not be able to remove themselves 
from, and peer pressures). 
141. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-16 (2002) (detailing states which changed 
their laws to no longer allow death penalties for those with intellectual developmental disorders 
after public protests called for an end to the imminent execution of a man diagnosed with 
intellectual developmental deficiencies).  
142. Lain, supra note 77, at 668-69 (“For the purpose of this discussion, what mattered in 
Furman was that two concurring Justices—Justices Brennan and Marshall—made a bold doctrinal 
move in suggesting that a punishment could be “cruel and unusual” for no reason other than that it 
had become unpopular.”) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 270 n.10, 277-306 (Brennan, J., 
concurring); id. at 332-72 (Marshall, J., concurring)). 
143. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55 (1974) (addressing the respondent’s pleas, the 
Court deferred to legislative action and stated, “ . . . it is not for us to choose one set of values over 
the other.  If respondents are correct, and the view which they advocate is indeed the more 
enlightened and sensible one, presumably the people of the State of California will ultimately come 
around to that view.”). 
144. Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 790 F.2d 1220, 1223 (5th Cir. 1986).   
145. Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248, 260-61 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding corporal 
punishment of school children was acceptable under the Eighth Amendment because the practice 
had not become “unacceptable to contemporary society” or “abhor[r]ed by popular sentiment”). 
146. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (analyzing the legal grounds of forfeiture 
as a punishment, then referring to the legislative history of the statute in question to determine if 
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the Court said sanctions serve more than one purpose and sanctions partly 
serving as punishment are punitive.147  
Next, the Court determines if the punishment of disenfranchisement is 
cruel and unusual.  The Court will consider if the punishment is contrary 
to the “evolving standards of decency” and disproportionate.148  In Trop, 
the court provided some contours for determining what punishment 
offended the standards of a civilized society.149  The Court usually 
considers objective criteria such as the current position of state laws, 
proposed legislation, jury behavior, public opinion polls, professional 
organization opinions and international law.150  These objective criteria 
illuminate the current climate and help judges make decisions tied to 
some external source.  However, we must caution that the Court is 
privileged to decide what weight to give the evidence before it and, 
notably, the Court has not always weighed different criteria the same, 
and, finally, it is also required to find a constitutional violation if one 
exists, notwithstanding public opinion.151   
Therefore, the Court could find that the punishment of 
disenfranchisement, combined with the unequal representation created by 
prison gerrymandering, is contrary to the evolving standards of decency.  
It could anchor its opinion in international law like it did in Trop or 
consider the wave of states loosening laws on felon disenfranchisement 
coupled with citizen initiatives as strong indicia that public sentiments 
 
Congress intended the statute to be punishing or remedial); see also Wilkins, supra note 80, at 139-
41 (reviewing judicial opinions, statutory interpretation, and opinion polls to show a marked shift 
towards generally understanding disenfranchisement to be punitive). 
147. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1997), abrogated by Hudson v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) (“. . . it follows that a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to 
serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or 
deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term.”). 
148. Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 332-333 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 
U.S. 97 (1976)). 
149. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958) (“The basic concept underlying the Eighth 
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.  While the State has the power to punish, the 
Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.”). 
150. Wilkins, supra note 80, at 139 (analyzing the courts using these methods, but also 
pointing out Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 322 (2002), 
arguing that other countries should not determine the United States response). 
151. Lain, supra note 77, at 672-673 & nn. 52-55 (comparing Supreme Court decisions that 
either rejected or leaned heavily on various sources of arguments in determining whether there was 
an Eighth Amendment violation). 
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have changed.152  Undoubtedly, reclaiming the franchise of incarcerated 
persons poses a great challenge because the public has not yet made 
formidable attempts to restore the vote for prisoners.153  Only two states 
allow prisoners to vote currently, but others are taking notice and 
reconsidering civil death in light of massive incarceration rates.154  Still, 
change is often incremental and the legal and public challenges to felon 
disenfranchisement laws for previously incarcerated persons could 
produce more public scrutiny of the process overall.  
4. Texas Must Change Its Ways: Unlock the Vote for Prisoners 
Texas need not wait for litigation or subsequent court action.  Rather, 
Texas should be required to make a choice: either count prisoners in their 
home jurisdictions or allow them to vote.  The reasons for allowing 
prisoners to vote are manifold and manifest, and they have been 
expounded upon at length in law review articles and news articles 
 
152. Sarah C. Grady, Civil Death Is Different: An Examination of a Post Graham Challenge 
to Felon Disenfranchisement Under the Eighth Amendment, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 441, 
464-65 (2013). 
153. See Pinaire et al., supra note 136 (finding 9.9% of persons surveyed said that  
they believed convicted felons should never lose their right to vote).  But see State Advocacy News: 
Strategies to End Life Imprisonment, Expand the Vote, and Strengthen Reentry Policies, 
SENTENCING PROJECT (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.sentencingproject.org/news/state-advo 
cacy-news-strategies-end-life-imprisonment-expand-vote-strengthen-reentry-policies/ (discussing 
Florida voters’ passage of Amendment Four to the Florida Constitution, enfranchising around one 
million Floridians who had lost the right to vote due to felony convictions, sparking lawmakers and 
advocates in California, Iowa, Minnesota, New Mexico, New Jersey, and Kentucky to advance 
similarly restorative measures); Exec. Order No. 181, Restoring the Right to Vote for New Yorkers 
on Parole (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/ 
EO_181.pdf (Governor Andrew Cuomo expanded voting rights to those on parole, voting rights to 
those on probation had already been granted); Brianne Pfannenstiel, Exclusive: Gov. Kim Reynolds 
to Propose Constitutional Amendment Lifting Felon Voting Ban in Condition of the State, DES 
MOINES REG. (Jan. 15, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/ 
2019/01/15/kim-reynolds-felon-voting-rights-constitutional-amendment-lift-ban-iowa-legislature-
proposal-2019/2572308002/?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=83282a7b-68d9-4309-a713-c9eae9 
e97829 [https://perma.cc/X2X6-QESY] (broadcasting an interview with Governor Kim Reynolds 
of Iowa on future legislative agendas that would restore voting rights to felons). 
154. See Jane Timm, Most States Disenfranchise Felons, NBC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2018), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/states-rethink-prisoner-voting-rights-incarcerati 
on-rates-rise-n850406 [https://perma.cc/39RV-QP4N] (reporting that New Jersey’s legislature 
plans on proposing a bill that would allow prisoners to vote, modeled on Maine and Vermont where 
prisoners can currently vote). 
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alike.155  But since only Maine and Vermont allow currently incarcerated 
persons to vote (and both Massachusetts and Utah recently revoked such 
a right), the reasons evidently still bear repeating.  If one of the goals of 
prison time is rehabilitation, one of the best ways to produce civic 
responsibility is to get incarcerated persons in the habit of voting as soon 
as possible.  Prisoners must be allowed to vote for the very reasons that 
all United States citizens are allowed and encouraged to vote: voting 
integrates and entrenches the voter in society, voting connects voters to 
one another as co-citizens and participants, and voters with experience in 
a system are the most qualified to vote on policies to guide that system.  
If prisoners are meant to become productive members of society, why 
wouldn’t that journey begin as soon as possible?   
The United States prison system is either meant to be rehabilitative  
or punitive, depending on who and when you ask.  Some prisons in  
the United States once aimed for rehabilitation, becoming places in  
which inmates were “encouraged to develop occupational skills and to 
resolve psychological problems—such as substance abuse or 
aggression—that might interfere with their reintegration into  
 
155. See, e.g., Anthony Gray, Securing Felons’ Voting Rights in America, 16 BERKELEY J. 
AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 3, 19 (2014) (“[Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution] is 
indicative of the fact that a universal franchise is fundamental to the representative system of 
government for which the Constitution provides . . . numerous amendments . . . prohibit denial of 
voting rights, for example due to race, ‘previous servitude,’ gender, age or failure to pay tax are 
constitutionally forbidden.”); Marc Mauer, Voting Behind Bars: An Argument for Voting by 
Prisoners, 54 HOWARD L.J. 549, 559 (2011) (“ . . . [Disenfranchisement] policies exacerbate many 
of the problems associated with disenfranchisement . . . they create significant limitations on full 
democratic participation by citizens, run counter to efforts to promote public safety, and exacerbate 
existing inequalities in the criminal justice system.  These include limitations on the electorate, 
enhanced racial disparity, and exacerbating challenges for reentry.”); Gregg Caruso, Why  
Prisoners and Ex-Felons Should Retain the Right to Vote, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Nov. 6, 2016), 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/unjust-deserts/201611/why-prisoners-and-ex-felons-
should-retain-the-right-vote [https://perma.cc/9NSJ-R2UY] (“[D]isempowering and 
disenfranchising prisoners and ex-felons has the effect of dehumanizing and marginalizing  
them, sometimes permanently.  Philosophically arbitrary and perpetual punishment, including  
the denial of voting rights to people who have paid their debt, imposed second-class citizenship on 
millions of citizens.”); Corey Brettschneider, Why Prisoners Deserve the Right to Vote,  
POLITICO MAG. (June 21, 2016), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/prisoners-
convicts-felons-inmates-right-to-vote-enfranchise-criminal-justice-voting-rights-213979 [https:// 
perma.cc/7RT6-3DSN] (“Prison is itself already severe punishment.  The deprivation of liberty and 
the loss of control over everyday interaction, including the ability to see one’s loved ones on a daily 
basis, are all severe constraints imposed by incarceration.  One can be punished without being 
subjected to civic exile.”). 
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society.”156  In the 1970s, the emerging (and persisting) “tough on 
crime” political tactic meant that prisons became merely punitive for 
those housed within;157 incarceration was “an instrument of society’s 
retributive vengeance” for harming those whom it viewed as dangerous, 
while simultaneously exorcising that danger from the lives of the 
supposedly righteous.158  More recently, advocates have pushed for a 
return to the rehabilitative prison model, citing both moral159 and 
economic advantages.160  The United States does an abysmal job of 
rehabilitating its prisoners,161 especially compared to more intentionally 
palliative European programs.162  This Article assumes, arguendo, that 
rehabilitation is supposed to be the U.S. prison system’s primary goal.  
Inmate participation in democracy would create reintegration for 
inmates rejoining American society at large.  Voters are more invested in 
the workings of their government, the issues that affect society, and more 
 
156. Etienne Benson, Rehabilitate or Punish?, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, July/Aug. 2003, at 
46, https://www.apa.org/monitor/julaug03/rehab.aspx [https://perma.cc/FS4Q-FJCT]. 
157. See id. (“Researchers have also found that the pessimistic “nothing works” attitude 
toward rehabilitation that helped justify punitive prison policies in the 1970s was overstated.”). 
158. Austin MacCormick, The Prison’s Role in Crime Prevention, 41 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 36, 37-38 (1950-1951). 
159. See, e.g. Sri Sri Ravi Shankar, Opinion, We Must Do More to Rehabilitate Inmates, 
HILL (Jan. 26, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/international/370908-we-must-do-more-to-
rehabilitate-us-inmates [https://perma.cc/3LEN-LBEN] (arguing that rehabilitation programs can 
help inmates deal with stress and emotions, and that rehabilitation should be taken with a more 
holistic approach like that of medical care). 
160. Jacob Reich, The Economic Impact of Prison Rehabilitation Programs,  
PENN WHARTON (August 17, 2017), https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/news/2059-the-
economic-impact-of-prison-rehabilitation/for-students/blog/news.php [https://perma.cc/6FJ6-VS 
CE] (citing case studies showing thousands of dollars in savings for states that implement 
rehabilitative programs like work-release programs, drug and alcohol treatment, and education). 
161. See, e.g., Christopher Zoukis, U.S. Prisoners the Least Rehabilitated in the World, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/us-prisoners-the-least-
rehabilitated-in-the-world_us_59bd49eae4b06b71800c39d7 [https://perma.cc/QNM4-867E] (“In 
addition to locking people up at unprecedented rates, America also lays claim to the highest 
recidivism rate in the word—a staggering 76 percent.  Compare that with Norway, which boasts 
the lowest rate at just 20 percent.”). 
162. Zeeshan Aleem, Sweden’s Remarkable Prison System Has Done What the U.S. Won’t 
Even Consider, MIC NETWORK INC. (Jan. 27, 2015), https://mic.com/articles/109138/sweden-has-
done-for-its-prisoners-what-the-u-s-won-t#.3gRSqrXea [https://perma.cc/2L64-DFYU] (“[I]n the 
past decade, the number of Swedish prisoners has dropped from 5,722 to 4,500 out of a population 
of 9.5 million.  The country has closed a number of prisons, and the recidivism rate is around 40%, 
which is far less than in the U.S. and most European countries.”). 
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personally, the issues that affect them.163  If prisoners were universally 
enfranchised, rehabilitation would be aided by increasing their 
investment in their communities and paving the way in becoming more 
effective members of society upon release.164   
If prison is meant to take a transgressor and turn him into a productive 
member of society, then voting is an indispensable step in that process.  
Incarceration inherently separates the incarcerated from the rest of 
America in every way, including physically.  That separation often 
continues long after release, leading to staggering levels of recidivism 
(nearly 77% according to a Bureau of Justice report), a massive 
rehabilitative failure.165  Voting is a simple and logical way to keep 
inmates connected to the population they will one day rejoin.   
Voting involves the voter in their respective communities in distinct 
ways other civic activities do not. Voting is more intentional than paying 
taxes, more convenient than attending a city council meeting, and more 
enjoyable than getting a speeding ticket.  Even before elections were 
widely available to non-White non-males, those who examined American 
democracy expounded upon the uniquely participatory power of the vote.  
In 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America credited “the 
interrelationship between the self and the community” as the cornerstone 
of American democracy, enabling Americans to “reconcile their personal 
well-being with the common welfare of the people.”166  If inmates were 
 
163. See PEW RES. CTR., MOST VOTERS HAVE POSITIVE VIEWS OF THEIR MIDTERM 
VOTING EXPERIENCES 14 (2018), http://www.people-press.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2018/ 
12/12-17-18-Voter-experiences-upt.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/VL4V-PDTA] (reporting that a large 
portion of those who did not vote in the midterm elections in 2018 did not like politics, felt their 
vote did not matter, or did not care who won). 
164. See Brettschneider, supra note 155 (“As prisons have grappled with the explosion in 
their populations in the past 20 years, allegations of prisoner maltreatment multiply, and criminal 
justice reform moves to the fore of our political debate, we should consider that one of the best 
ways to solve these intractable and expensive problems would be to listen to those currently 
incarcerated—and to allow them to represent themselves in our national political 
conversation. . . . A prison constituency with rights to vote and related rights of free speech can 
engage in civic activism that will continue after release.”). 
165. Matthew R. Durose et al., Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005: 
Patterns from 2005 to 2010 U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS 7 (Apr. 2014), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510.pdf (reporting that rearrests after release of 
inmates was 43.4% one year after release, rising to 67.8% three years after release, and finally 
76.6% five years after release). 
166. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 72 (trans. Henry Reeve, ed. 
Francis Bowen, 3d ed. 1863) (1835). 
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allowed to vote while incarcerated, they would be consistently connecting 
their choices and personal well-being to the good of the community they 
are meant to rejoin.  Such a connection has great potential to set a pattern 
of involvement and empathy with the larger population that will continue 
long after an inmate has been released.  In other words, what the crime 
has torn asunder, voting can glue together.   
In addition to reintegrating inmates into society, the right to vote 
humanizes those who possess it.  Voting is “regarded as a fundamental 
political right, because it is preservative of all rights.”167  These truths 
were known to the Women’s Suffrage and Civil Rights Movements alike, 
and America has seen them borne as non-White non-males gained the 
right to vote.    
Much like the fight for inmate suffrage, the war for women’s suffrage 
was waged on many fronts—litigation, policy, public opinion, and state 
policy—for many years, propelled by the notion that women would not 
be full citizens until they were awarded full participation.  Susan B. 
Anthony’s argument for women’s suffrage articulated this idea perfectly:  
It was we, the people; not we, the white male citizens; nor yet we, the male 
citizens; but we, the whole people, who formed the Union.  And we formed 
it, not to give the blessings of liberty, but to secure them; not to the half of 
ourselves and the half of our posterity, but to the whole people.168 
Other suffragists improved upon Anthony’s limited platform of 
suffrage which, unfortunately, involved opposition to the Fourteenth 
Amendment because of its inclusion of the word “male.”169  The 
successful Black publisher and activist Josephine St. Pierre Ruffin 
declared herself “justified in believing that the success of this movement, 
for equality of the sexes means more progress toward equality of the 
races.”170  But the fight was not over once women won the right to vote.  
Suffragettes still had to convince womankind to show up to the polls.   
 
167. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). 
168. Susan B. Anthony, On Women’s Right to Vote (1873), http://www.historyplace.com/ 
speeches/anthony.htm [https://perma.cc/AH9P-RE5F]. 
169. Jone Johnson Lewis, Women’s Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, THOUGHTCO. 
(June 4, 2018), https://www.thoughtco.com/womens-rights-and-the-fourteenth-amendment-3529 
473 [https://perma.cc/J7PE-SYTH]. 
170. Josephine St. Pierre Ruffin, Trust the Women!, in 10 THE CRISIS: VOTES FOR WOMEN 
no. 1, at 188 (May 1915). 
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Author Louisa May Alcott, the first woman to register in Concord, 
Massachusetts, groused in her journal about the reluctance of her fellow 
Concord women to cast a ballot, and even “offered to drive the timid 
sheep to the fatal spot where they seem to expect some awful doom.”171  
Eventually, women began to show up on their own free will, and they 
began electing women whose policies reflected their own.172  Similarly, 
the struggle for Black men’s suffrage only began with the ratification of 
the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, which was followed by a long period 
of poll taxes, literacy test, grandfather clauses, and other barriers to 
voting.173  The road has been long, and is paved with the blood of 
innocent protestors and leaders seeking the participation that the 
Constitution already promised them.174  More so than women’s suffrage, 
Black Americans’ rights to vote are still under attack, and the Prison-
Industrial complex exacerbates the challenge.175  But the Congress 
elected in November was the most diverse yet, leaving open the 
possibility that the policies passed by that Congress will expand 
opportunities for People of Color in the future.176   
 
171. LOUISA MAY ALCOTT, THE JOURNALS OF LOUISA MAY ALCOTT (Joel Myerson & 
Daniel Shealy eds., 1989). 
172. See History of Women in the U.S. Congress, CTR. FOR AM. WOMEN & POL., 
http://cawp.rutgers.edu/history-women-us-congress [https://perma.cc/UKH5-58XS] (showing the 
number of women in both the House and Senate from one woman in the House of Representatives 
during the sixty-fifth legislature to a total of 110 women in the 150th legislature). 
173. Libr. of Congress, 15th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, WEB GUIDES, 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/15thamendment.html [https://perma.cc/RD7K-28 
2S]. 
174. See From Selma to Shelby County: Working Together to Restore the Protections of the 
Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 5 (2013) (statement 
of Representative Hon. John Lewis) (“In many parts of this country, people were denied the right 
to register to vote simply because of the color of their skin. They were harassed, intimidated, and 
fired from their jobs and forced off of farms and plantations.  Those who tried to assist were beaten, 
arrested, jailed, or even murdered.  Before the Voting Rights Act, people stood in unmovable 
lines.”). 
175. See Vann R. Newkirk II, In the Georgia Governor’s Race, the Game is Black Votes, 
THE ATL. (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/10/georgia-race-
mired-minority-vote-suppression-charges/572854/ [https://perma.cc/W3N5-S8RK] (describing the 
difficulties Black people faced registering and voting for Georgia’s 2018 midterm and gubernatorial 
races). 
176. Richie Zweigenhaft, The 116th Congress Has More Women and People of Color Than 
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Inmate suffrage is no different from the movements before it.  It is 
simply the next frontier.  Prisoners are notoriously neglected by 
politicians.  Giving them the right to vote would require politicians to 
visit prisons, see the conditions, and advocate policies that improve the 
lives of the incarcerated citizens of their district.177  Accountability is 
even more reduced in Texas since prisoners are counted where they bunk 
when drawing electoral districts.178  Incarcerated people are full citizens, 
but since they cannot vote, their representatives have no incentive to 
actually represent them.179  Prisons are like neighborhoods entirely 
zoned out of voting.  Inmates deserve the right to vote for candidates of 
their choice whom they believe will represent their interests and, if they 
desire, reflect their own community.   
CONCLUSION 
Leaders of all parties and persuasions sound the call to United States 
citizens to get out and vote.180  Inmates are in a unique situation among 
Americans in that they are acknowledged as full citizens, but unable to 
claim a right to participate in running their own nation.  To paraphrase a 
quote from suffragette Amelia Bloomer: it will not do to say that it is out 
of the inmate’s sphere to assist in making laws, for if that were so, then it  
  
 
177. Brettschneider, supra note 155. 
178. Ramsey, supra note 38. 
179. Brettschneider, supra note 155. 
180. See, e.g., Barack Obama, Barack Obama: You Need to Vote Because Our Democracy 
Depends on It, GUARDIAN (Sept. 8, 2018, 6:22 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2018/sep/08/barack-obama-you-need-to-vote-because-our-democracy-depends-on 
-it [https://perma.cc/KC8Q-5KV3] (“But when there’s a vacuum in our democracy, when we  
don’t vote, when we take our basic rights and freedoms for granted, when we turn away and stop 
paying attention and stop engaging and stop believing and look for the newest diversion . . . then 
other voices fill the void.”); Patrick Svitek, In U.S. Senate Race, Both Sides Take Heart in Massive 
Early Voting Numbers, TEX. TRIB. (Oct. 27, 2018), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/10/27/us-
senate-ted-cruz-beto-orourke-see-promise-massive-early-voting/ [https://perma.cc/S8UQ-3ZKS] 
(statement by Ted Cruz during 2018 midterm elections: “I have always said if Texans show up and 
vote, we are going to have a very good election. Texans are showing up to vote.”).  But see David 
C. Barker & Christopher Jan Carman, This is Why So Many Republicans Are Ready to Ignore Public 
Opinion on Health Care, WASH. POST (June 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/27/this-is-why-so-many-republicans-are-ready-to-buck-public-opinion-
on-health-care/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ef9a0fa9b37c [https://perma.cc/GD8N-AVHY] 
(describing a study showing that Republican representatives do not often lead in accordance with 
their constituents polling preferences, exercising “trustee-style” representation). 
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should be also out of her sphere to submit to them.181  
 
 
181. Amelia Bloomer, ATHENA UNLIMITED (Aug. 26, 2018), https://www.athenaunlimited. 
com/empowerher-blog/amelia-bloomer [https://perma.cc/ELF9-CK2M]. 
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